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URBAN FAMINE OR URBAN CRISIS?
TYPHUS IN THE VICTORIAN CITY
by
ANNE HARDY*
There were four horsemen ofthe Apocalypse: War, Famine, Disease and Death, a
historic association which has continued into modern times. For most ofhistory, the
diseasemostcommonlylinkedwiththisawfulpartnershiphasbeentyphus, andtyphus
has become known as the archetypal famine fever. The aetiology of the disease has,
however, rarely been examined in its historical context; as a result, historians have
often misinterpreted its significance. In one recent article, forexample, the disease was
treated as an indicator ofurban famine, ofthe extent to which the nutritional status of
the Lancashire textile operatives was reduced by the Cotton Famine ofthe 1860s.1 In
the nineteenth century, however, epidemics oftyphus occurred in both times ofstress
and times of prosperity: unlike its cousin, relapsing fever, typhus is not a primary
indicator of "true, nutritional famine".
Why did typhus disappear as a significant cause of death in the late nineteenth
century? Thediseasewasalmostcertainly endemicinpockets ofcities across Britain in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; from time to time there were epidemic
outbreaks. What were the different factors that permitted the survival ofthe disease,
stimulated epidemics, and finally led to its virtual disappearance in the 1870s? The
commonly-assumed causal link between typhus and famine, or at least malnutrition,
raises the question of dearth and living standards in the nineteenth century. The
harvest-related subsistence crisis had vanished by the late eighteenth century; but do
typhus epidemics indicate periods of dearth in nineteenth-century cities? Or was
typhus's survival rather a question of hygiene? For the urban historian H. J. Dyos,
typhus was an indicator of "dirt and destitution"; for Thomas McKeown, of
malnutrition and lowlevelsofpersonalhygiene.2Theanswerisperhapsmorecomplex:
in arecentanalysisofthe Europeansubsistencecrisis of1740JohnPosthasarguedthat
the links between food shortages and disease are more social than nutritional, that
typhus is not an indicator offamineper se, but the consequence ofsocial dislocation
*Anne Hardy, D.Phil., 22 Norham Road, Oxford OX2 6SF.
l D. Oddy, 'Urban famine in nineteenth-century Britain', Econ. Hist. Rev., second series, Feb. 1983,
37: 83.
2 H. J. Dyos, 'Some historical reflections on the quality ofurban life', in David Cannadine and David
Reeder (editors), Exploring the urban past. Essays in urban history by H. J. Dyos, Cambridge University
Press, 1982, p. 72; Thomas McKeown, The modern rise ofpopulation, London, Edward Arnold, 1976,
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produced by harvest failure and distress.3 In such social crises, patterns of human
behaviour alter; and increased mobility, domestic crowding and reduced personal
hygiene result in epidemics. The behaviour of epidemic typhus in the nineteenth
century supports this argument: the disease survived as long as social dislocation
continued to be an intermittent feature ofurban life, before rising and stabilizing real
wages reduced the impact ofeconomic upheavals on the lives ofthe working classes.
The language ofurban crisis, ofsubsistence crisis, and ofurban famine, generally
appears in the historiography ofthe pre-industrial world,4 and is rarely applied to the
nineteenth century. Historical debatesaboutdearth anddisease in the latereighteenth
and nineteenth centuries centre on long-term issues, especially that of the extent to
which improving-or stationary, or regressing-nutritional status influenced long-
term trends in mortality from a range of endemic and epidemic diseases.5 In this
debate, the mortality crises which continued to occur in individual cities, and the
diseases which caused them, have received relatively little attention.6 Yet local studies
may help our understanding ofthe mechanics ofmortality change. Recent American
research shows acorrelation between short-termvariations in urban mortality and the
business cycle. The relationship is said to hold for both major epidemics and other
diseases, and to be closely related to the pattern of European immigration:7 the
epidemiological peaks illustrate the pattern of social and economic dislocation.
Although this model is not entirely applicable to Britain, typhus is a disease ofsocial
dislocation, and its survival as an epidemic disease in England as late as the 1860s
reflects not simply or necessarily hunger, but the complex social consequences ofthe
inherent instability of an emergent industrial economy.8
If "urban crises" are seen as continuing into the nineteenth century, the
circumstances inwhich typhusepidemics occurred maythrowfurtherlight onmortality
decline, andontheroleofnutritioninthisdecline. Thispapercontendsthattyphushas
a significance beyond nutritional levels. In terms of social history, Victorian typhus
illustrates the social andeconomic insecurity ofurban lifeup to the 1870s, andtheway
3 John D. Post, Food shortage, climatic variability, and epidemic disease in preindustrial Europe; the
mortalitypeak in theearly 1740s, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985; seealso, idem, 'Climatic variability
and the European mortality wave of the early 1740s', J. interdisciplinary Hist., summer 1984, 15: 1-30.
4Among a large literature, see for example, Peter Clark and Paul Slack, English towns in transition,
Oxford University Press, 1976; Charles Pythian-Adams and Paul Slack, Urban crisis or urban change?,
Milton Keynes, Open University, 1977; John D. Post, The lastgreat subsistence crisis in the Western world,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977; Paul Slack, The impact ofplague in Tudor and Stuart England,
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, chapter 3.
5 Theliteratureincludes F.W.Notestein, 'Population-thelongview',inT. W. Schultz(editor),Foodfor
theworld, Chicago University Press, 1945, pp. 36-57; T. McKeownand Record, 'Thedeclineofmortality in
the 19th century', Population Stud., November 1962, 16: 98-122; McKeown, op. cit., note 2 above;
A. B. Appleby, 'Nutrition and disease: the case ofLondon, 1550-1750', J. interdisciplinary Hist., summer
1975, 6: 1-22; and the essays in the following Special Issues of J. interdisciplinary Hist.: 'Hunger and
history', autumn 1983, 14, no. 2, and 'Population and history', spring 1985, 15, no. 4.
6 Ofthediseaseswhich caused suchcrises, onlycholerahasbeenexaminedindetail. Choleraincidence is
unrelated to nutritional status, and the disease was, like plague before it, an "invader": the term is used by
Slack, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 14.
7 R. Higgs, 'Cycles and trends ofmortality in 18 large American cities, 1871-1900', Explor. Econ. Hist.,
1979, 16: 381-408.
8 L. D. Schwarz, 'The standard ofliving in the long run: London, 1700-1860', Econ. Hist. Rev., second
series, 1985, 38: 32.
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in which local economic conditions helped to determine outbreaks of disease; on the
medical side, typhus's independence ofnutritional status explains both its unpredictable
appearances, and its disappearance from England at a time when the nutritional- and,
probably, the hygienic level ofthe "submerged tenth" remained relatively unchanged.9
I
Bythenineteenth century, typhus had become anessentially urban disease ofsporadic
outbreaks, in England and elsewhere. Throughout the century, Liverpool in particular
continued to provide "a habitation and a name" for the disease.'0 Nevertheless, in the
1870s typhus mortality entered a decline which can now be seen to have been final. The
social associations of typhus suggest reasons for its disappearance, but do not fully
explain its epidemic pattern. In an attempt to understand why epidemic typhus
disappeared in the later nineteenth century, circumstances in London, a city where the
diseasewasalmostendemicand repeatedlyepidemicintheearlierpart ofthe century, are
here examined more closely. London experienced a major, but final, typhus epidemic in
1861-69. Offourprevious epidemics during the century, three had been associated with
economicdepression, andtheotherwiththepotato famineof1847-48.1" Theepidemicof
1861 began without any obvious trigger; indeed, it began in London in December 1861,
but in Lancashire in October 1862. It is clear that in the 1860s London was a city under
stress; thisconditionwas notwithout parallel in other Englishcities, but it was unrelated
to any wider, national economic cnsis.
Gareth Stedman Jones has shown that there was a continuing economic crisis in
London's East End in the 1860s. It began with the final decline of the silk-weaving
industry, wascompounded by thecollapse ofthe Poplar ship-building industry in 1866,
andits socialeffects wereaggravated byhousedemolitions making way for factory- and
warehousebuilding,improvementschemes, andrailwayconstruction.12Thelastwasnot
limited to the East End, and in 1860 distress had been increasing generally among
London's working population as a result of building trade strikes. At this time, the
national economy had barely begun to recover from the effects of the Crimean War.
Average real wages, which declined sharply during the war years, returned to normal in
1859-60, butwere undermined by bad weather and poorharvests in 1860-2 and again in
1866-8.13 National concern focused on the Lancashire textile districts suffering from the
effects ofthe Cotton Famine; and the crisis in London went almost unremarked, except
by the medical press, hospital workers and the recently appointed Medical Officers of
Health, whose duties were intimately connected with the condition of the people.'4
9 For brief recent surveys ofstandards ofliving in the later nineteenth century, and the survival ofthe
"submerged tenth", see E. H. Hunt, British labour history 1815-1914, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
1981, pp. 73-129; Michael S. Teitelbaum, The British fertility decline, Princeton University Press, 1984,
pp. 37-43.
0 Lancet, 1896, ii: 548.
"See note 57 below.
12 G. S. Jones, Outcast London, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, chapters 3-5.
13 B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract ofBritish historicalstatistics, Cambridge University Press, 1962,
pp. 343, 498; Jones, op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 44-6.
14 Lancet, 1863, i: 422. The London Medical Officers of Health took up their duties in the city's civil
parishes in 1856.
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The London building trades strikes beginning in 1859 were among the first serious
manifestations ofthe Nine Hours Movementwhichhademergedin Liverpool in 1846.
In 1859,the Londonmasterbuildersresortedtoalock-outofthosemenwhowouldnot
pledgethemselvesnottojoinatradeunion. Thestrike, orlock-out, lasted from21 July
1859 to March 1860. Twenty-four thousand menwere said to have been locked out; by
theendofSeptembersome 14,000werereceivingallowances fromtheconference ofthe
trade societies.15 The allowances were far from adequate, however, and as the means
and credit of the men failed, the effects of the lock-out were felt more widely: small
shopkeepers, for example, instead of taking £9-10 weekly from building-trades
families, took no more than £2-3. As long as there was bread, the Registrar-General
observed, the children had it, but weakened, cold and ill-clad, they died in unusual
numbers towards the end of the year.'6
Inthe spring of 1861, when themasters tried tointroduce asystem ofpaymentbythe
hour, the workers struck again. This time, the strike lasted barely a month. The 1859
strike and thecold winter of 1860-1 had lowered the resources ofboth men and unions;
such masters as Lucas and Kelk, under contract for the Great Exhibition building for
1862, were anxious to avoid any protracted argument. By 20 April, the strike was at an
end.'7 The cumulative effect of the strikes was probably to weaken the economy of
working class London generally. There was scarcely a district ofthe city in which, by
1861, these trades did not form a substantial proportion of the working population:
between 7.5 and 11.5 per cent of the males over twenty years old.18
1861 also saw the beginning of clearances preparatory to three major railway
projects, affectingcentral and east London. The Charing Cross Railway's newjunction
at Red Cross Street, with an extension to Cannon Street, displaced 557 persons; the
North London Railway's extension from Kingsland to Broad Street displaced between
four and five thousand; the Metropolitan Railway's extension from Smithfield to
Finsbury Circus displaced 1,100.19 In Southwark, South London, two major railway
operations, in 1859-64 and 1860-64, forced over 7,700 persons to move.20 In north
London, the demolition ofthe Agar Town slum to make way for St Pancras Station in
1862-4, sent waves ofdislocation through Marylebone, St Pancras and St Giles.2' By
1862, London's major working-class areas, in the southern, central and eastern
districts, were all subjected to large scale railway clearances. The slum-clearance and
street-building operations of the Metropolitan Board of Works added to the
problem.22 Both developments were quick to take effect: as early as 1863, Medical
OfficersofHealthwereawareofincreased overcrowding. In 1867, DrPearce ofBethnal
Green estimated that in some cases rents had increased by as much as 50 per cent.23
15 For the background to these strikes, see Richard Price, Masters, unions and men: work control in
building and the rise oflabour 1830-1914, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 15-54.
16 Twenty-second annual report of the Registrar-General, [PP, 1861, XVIII, p. 41].
7 The Times, 23, 26, 28 March 1861; 20 April 1861.
18 The district percentage figures were: East, 7.5; Central, 7.6; South, 9.2; West, 10.6; and North, 11.5 per
cent of males over 20.
19 H. J. Dyos, 'Some social costs ofrailway building in London', J. transp. Hist., 1957,3:21. See also idem,
'Railways and housing in Victorian London', J. transp. Hist., 1955, 2: 11-21.
20 Ibid.
21 MOAR St Pancras, 1862, 6; 1864, p. 8.
22 Dyos, 'Railways', op. cit., note 19 above; Jones, op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 162-3, 215-17.
23 MOAR St Giles, 1863, p. 16; MOAR Shoreditch, 1863, p. 11; MOAR Bethnal Green, 1867, p. 4.
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TheimpactofovercrowdinginLondoninthe 1860scanbeilluminated,tosomeextent,
by modem research. Density in American cities has been found to have a uniformly
positive and statistically significant effect on mortality. Household density is thought to
aggravate such stresses as do exist in low income populations, which in certain
circumstances affect mental and physical health. In nineteenth-century cities, erratic
employment, nutritional deficiencies, insecure living standards, high immigration levels
ofpeople with no previous experience ofurban life, and overcrowdingcreated "optimal
conditions for pervasive morbidity and high mortality".24 In the London of the late
1860s, these conditions existed in no mean degree, and were aggravated by ruthless
slum-clearance and coincident depression in the working-class economy. Provincial
immigration probablyaddedtotheproblem. Ithasbeenestimatedthatimmigrationinto
London rosein 1861-71 to331,000, over286,000 in 1851-61. It roseagain, to 498,000 in
1871-81, falling only to 402,000 in 1881-91.25
The year 1861-62 marked the beginning ofan "artificial" subsistence crisis, one not
related to food shortages and excessively high prices. It was nonetheless real, and in the
forms ofsocial dislocation, increased overcrowding and rising rents, it lasted for several
years, in fact until about 1870, when the initiation ofnew railway operations began to
slackeninpace. Between 1867and 1872,nomajorworkswerebegun;26anditwasduring
theseyears that thegreat typhusepidemic, which had afflicted thepoorerdistricts ofthe
city since the end of 1861, finally came to an end.
II
Typhus, the "spotted fever" of sixteenth-century England, the "gaol fever" of the
eighteenth, the "Irish fever" ofthemid-nineteenth, has alonganddistinguished history
intimately associated with the social upheavals caused by war and famine.27 Although
longconfusedwithtyphoid, thetwodiseaseshavedistinctbehaviouralpatterns: typhoid
isendemic, typhusepidemic.Theeighteenthcentury,fromcirca 1708to 1815,constituted
thelast "great typhusperiod". After 1815, thediseaseonlyonceattaineditsformerscale
ofdiffusion in Europe, in 1846-7.28 In the first halfofthe nineteenth century therewere
numerous localized outbreaks of the disease, but after 1850, except in particular
circumstances (notably in Eastern Europe during World War I), epidemic frequency in
Europe declined markedly.29
The universal decline of epidemic typhus makes the analysis of reasons for its
disappearance problematic. Hans Zinsser, admitting the problem, pointed to the
24 R. Higgs and F. D. Booth, 'Mortality differentials within large American cities in 1890', Hum. Ecol.,
1979, 7: 353-69.
25 H. A. Shannon, 'Migration and the growth ofLondon, 1841-91. A statistical note', Econ. Hist. Rev.,
April 1935, 5: 84.
26 Dyos, 'Social costs', op. cit., note 19 above, p. 27.
27 See Hans Zinsser's classic, Rats, lice and history, London, George Routledge and Sons, 1935.
28 August Hirsch, Handbook ofgeographical and historicalpathology, vol. 1, London, New Sydenham
Society, 1883, pp. 554-5.
29 Zinsser, op. cit., note 27 above, pp. 290-301.
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"cooperative forces of modern civilized society"; to the development of intensive
agriculture and rail transport, which prevented the prolonged isolation of famine
districts; totheriseofmoderndiagnosticandpreventivemedicine; andespeciallytothe
fact that wars, in this period, were of short duration and affected relatively
circumscribed areas.30 Charles Creighton, referring to England only, argued for
improved nutrition as a factor.?3 George Rosen favoured slum clearance, the
regulation oflodging-houses, provision ofbaths and washhouses, the increased use of
cotton clothing which could be more frequently washed, as well as rising living
standards, as the principal causes ofdecline.32 McKeown and Record distinguished
environmental improvements, especially improved water supplies, and better diet as
salient features.33 In a recent study, Bill Luckin largely dismisses these factors, and
points to the pattern of Irish immigration into England.34 Finally, John Post's
important analysis suggests the reasons forthe behaviour ofthe disease in Europe as a
whole.
The infectious organism of typhus, Rickettsia prowazeki, appears to be invariably
louse-borne among human beings. Like dysentery, typhus appears wherever poverty,
crowding and insanitary conditions prevail, in times of social dislocation, and
principally in the winter months. The incubation period ofthe disease in man is ten to
fourteen days. Infected lice invariably die, usually within seven to twelve days; and
although theinfection is nottransmitted to theireggs, itcan survive in thedust oftheir
faeces for months or even years.35 The human louse is sensitive to temperature,
preferringthat of29°C which itfinds in the folds ofclothingwornby a healthy person.
Licethereforetendtoleavefebrilepatients, andcorpses, infavourofthosewithnormal
temperatures, but die in a few hours ifexposed to room temperature. They are easily
killedbycommonantiseptics, andonceatyphuspatienthasbeendelousedandbathed,
hecannot transmit the infection bycontact to others. Case-fatality in man varies from
10 to 40 per cent in untreated cases; nineteenth-century case-mortality is estimated to
have been between 20 and 45 per cent. Typhus fatality rises sharply with age, but one
attack confers immunity on survivors for many years.36
Throughout the nineteenth century, however, doctors and public health officials
worked in total ignorance ofthe true nature and origins oftyphus. Only in 1909 did
CharlesNicolleandhiscolleaguesattheInstitutPasteurinTunisshowthatinfection is
30 Ibid., p. 292.
31 C. Creighton, A History ofepidemics in Britain, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1894, p. 215.
32 G. Rosen, 'Disease, debilityanddeath', in H. J. Dyosand M. Wolff(editors), The Victorian city, vol.2,
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. 633-4; idem, A history ofpublic health, New York, M D
Publications, 1958, pp. 339-40.
33 McKeown and Record, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 116.
34 Bill Luckin, 'Typhus and typhoid in London', in R. Woods and J. Woodward (editors), Urban disease
and mortality in 19th-century England, London, Batsford Academic, 1984, pp. 111-116.
35 British encyclopedia ofmedicalpractice, second edition, vol. 12, London, Butterworth, 1952, p. 392.
36 Medical information on typhus has been drawn principally from William Topleyand Graham Wilson,
Principles ofbacteriology, virology and immunity, vol. 3, 7th edition, ed. G. R. Smith, London, Edward
Arnold, 1984, ch. 77; F. H. Top and P. H. Wherle, Communicable and infectious diseases, St Louis, MO,
Mosby, 1981, ch. 57; F. L. Horsfall and I. Tamm, Viral andrickettsial infections ofman, London, Pitman,
1965; P. D. Hoeprich (editor), Infectious diseases, Maryland, Harper and Row, 1977. The estimate of
nineteenth-century case fatality was made by Bill Luckin, op. cit., note 34 above, p. 104.
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spread by the body-louse ingesting the infected blood ofthe typhus patient.37 After
about a week, the rickettsiae have multiplied in the louse gut and are excreted in the
faeces. Healthy persons are generally infected through the skin, by scratching, and
sometimes by the inhalation of dust containing dried but still viable rickettsiae.
Transmission may thus occur through either individual louse infestation, or the
inhalation ofinfected dust. Modern treatment ofthediseaseiswithabroadspectrum
of antibiotics; prevention by the control or elimination of the insect vector, by
reducing louse infestation to a minimum and preventing overcrowding. In 1939-45,
for example, such long-acting insecticides as DDT were impregnated into clothing,
and sprayed over houses and potentially infected areas.38
In the 1860s, no such certainty existed. The diagnostical distinction between
typhoid and typhus, made by William Jenner in 1847-51, had become generally
accepted. There was general agreement, too, over the circumstances of typhus
transmission: inovercrowded localities and intimes ofdestitution.39 Thediseasewas
broadly recognized as contagious-hence the perceived dangers ofovercrowding-
but disagreement over the finer points of its behaviour continued. In particular,
Charles Murchison, the greatest fever expert of the 1860s,4° thought that typhus
might be independently generated, de novo, in conditions of squalor and
overcrowding.41 This belief was disputed by colleagues, and gradually became
discredited after Murchison's death: in manyplaces, overcrowding and squalorwere
constant, whereas typhus was only occasional.42 By the 1880s, medical men still
concerned with typhus were almost certain that it was transmitted exclusively by
contagion, but they had no positive means of proving their contention.43
The disagreement over spontaneous generation does not invalidate Murchison's
observations on the behaviour of typhus. It was generally known that typhus
frequently appeared without warning, and without the traceable contacts on which
contagion should depend. Murchison chose to explain this phenomenon by a
hypothesis of spontaneous generation; others assumed that the contagion was
imported in a fashion that defied detection.44 Observation similarly indicated the
role of infected clothes, and suggested that of infected housing.45 However, there
could be no clear explanation until the role ofthe louse and its faeces as vector, and
the dangers ofinfected dust, were understood. Following the distinction oftyphoid
37 Topley and Wilson, op. cit., note 36above, p. 575. Seealso James Busvine, Insects, hygieneandhistory,
London, Athlone Press, 1976, pp. 233-239.
38 Ibid., p. 578.
39 MargaretPelling, Cholera,fever andEnglish medicine, Oxford University Press, 1976,p. 283, notesthat
medical interestintyphusdeclined fromthesecondquarterofthenineteenthcentury, as thediseasewanedin
epidemic importance.
40Charles Murchison (1830-1879): Assistant Physician, London Fever Hospital, 1855; Physician,
1861-70; author of A treatise on the continuedfevers ofGreat Britain (first ed. 1862).
41 C. Murchison, Continuedfevers, 3rd ed., W. Cayley, (ed.), London, Longmans, Green & Co, 1884,
pp. 99-104.
42 Ibid., p. 99.
43 See George Buchanan and J. Spear in the Sixteenth annual report ofthe Medical Officer to the Local
Government Board, [PP, 1887, XXXVIII, pp. 635, 959-62]; Alex Collie, Onfevers, London, H. K. Lewis,
1887, pp. 105-7.
44 Ibid.
45 MOAR St Olave, 1867-8, p. 23.
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and typhus, and in the absence ofany bacteriological certainty, differing explanations of
the observed behaviour of the disease were perhaps inevitable.
Observations, however, led to a fundamentally correct preventive approach to the
disease, ofwhich thorough disinfection was the basis. From its earliest days, the London
Fever Hospital followed this policy with regard to typhus-"the infectious malignant
fever" of the metropolis-and besides removing infected individuals, attended to the
disinfection ofapartments, furniture and clothing in affected localities.46 For the rest of
thecentury this remained the accepted method ofdealing with typhus, and was generally
found effective, provided it was thoroughly carried out. In the district ofSt Olave in the
1860s, for example, houses were disinfected with Calvert's powder, carbolic acid and
chlorine, and infected bedding (a recognized vehicle of typhus) was disinfected before
being burnt.47 This, with the isolation of patients as far as possible, was the standard
preventive treatment. Even so, theremedy was flawed. Disinfection might beincomplete,
and there were often difficulties with contacts: in practice it was not easy to secure the
disinfection ofpersons, andclothes,exposed totyphus. Preventive authorities frequently,
and generally fruitlessly, urged the necessity of establishing houses of refuge where
personal purification could be carried out.48 The London Fever Hospital early found
fumigation and white-wash to be inadequate in certain areas.49 In some cases, the final
remedywasclosure ofaffected houses. In Orange Street, St Saviour, whereeleven typhus
cases occurred in January 1887, disinfection proved ineffectual, and the series ofcases
onlycametoanendwhenalltheinhabitants wereremoved to atemporary shelter, andall
the houses in the street closed.50
The recognition oftyphus as a separate entity from about 1850 makes it possible here
to treat it as a unified disease. This approach may be criticized on the grounds that the
Registrar-General did not distinguish the disease from typhoid and simple continued
fever until 1869, and that statistics and diagnoses before that date, and to some extent
afterit, are unreliable. There isclear evidence, however, that even before William Jenner
distinguished the different fevers in 1849, many physicians were aware oftheir differing
natures, and of the different treatments they required.5' After 1849, the distinction
between these fevers was very commonly accepted and made. In his report for 1848, the
physician ofthe London Fever Hospital outlined the clinical distinction between typhus
and typhoid, and from then on, the two diseases were regularly separated in the
Hospital's admissions- and mortality figures.52 From the 1850s, writers and
correspondents in the Lancet commonly used "typhus" and "typhoid" correctly, and
although there were still those who claimed that the two were varieties ofone fever, the
argumenthad died away bythe 1860s.53 The diagnoses ofthe London FeverHospital, in
46W. F. Bynum, 'Hospital, disease and community: the London Fever Hospital 1801-1850', in C.
Rosenberg (editor), Healing and history, New York, Dawson Science History Publications, 1979, p. 101.
47 MOAR St Olave, 1867-8, p. 23; MOAR St Saviour, 1871, p. 7.
48 Buchanan and Spear, op. cit., note 43 above, p. 960.
49 Bynum, op. cit., note 46 above p. 106.
50 MOAR St Saviour, 1887, pp. 28-9.
51 W. Jenner, Lecturesandessaysonfeversanddiptheria, 1849to 1879, London, Rivington, Percival &Co.,
1893; Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, pp. 31-51.
52 London Fever Hospital annual report [LFHAR] 1848, p. 9.
53 Lancet, 1855, i: 436; 1856, i: 159; 1857, i: 504.
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particular, are likely to be reliable: the Hospital's physicians were among the foremost
experts in diagnosis of these diseases, and its admissions figures for the two diseases
were regarded by the Registrar-General as the best index oftheir relative presence in
London.54 In 1868, Carl Wunderlich's publication of the results of his temperature
researches finally provided a reliable determinant for the diagnosis of typhoid, in
distinction to typhus;55 this was probably the basis on which the Registrar-General
officially admitted the distinction between the two diseases in 1869. Errors in
diagnosis, or terminology, continued to occur during the 1870s,56 and they
demonstrate that agggregate mortality figures should be treated with caution.
The variety of factors involved in the epidemiology of typhus make unlikely any
monocausal explanation of its virtual disappearance from England, indeed from
Europe, in the nineteenth century. Epidemics occurred widely in Britain in between
1816 and 1819, following the end ofthe Napoleonic Wars, and in 1847-8, consequent
on poorharvests and thepotato famine. In London, there wereadditionalepidemics in
1826, following the financial crisis of 1825; in 1836, again during major cyclical
depression; in 1856, after the end ofthe Crimean War and coincident depression; and
in the period 1862-70.57 The 1860s also saw major typhus epidemics in Liverpool
(1862-67) and Glasgow (1861-70); and various lesser outbreaks in Lancashire in the
autumn of 1862, during the early, acute phase ofthe Cotton Famine, and in Aberdeen,
Greenock and Dundee. Epidemics apart, however, the disease was never entirely
absent; indeed deaths from typhuscontinued to be registered down to 1900 (figure 1).58
Similarly, the register of admissions to the London Fever Hospital show that even
during non-epidemic years, the disease was active in the city (figure 1). Although the
epidemic conditions of the disease disappeared in the years after 1870, the materies
morbi, ever diminishing, remained.
The distribution of typhus in London was, until the 1870s, linked to specific areas
within the central, southern and eastern registration districts. Within these areas,
certain localities, possibly never free from fever, were popularly designated "fever
nests" from at least the 1830s;59 they were generally recognized by the public health
54 LFHAR 1872, p. 5; Lancet, 1859, i: 337.
55 L. G. Stevenson, 'Exemplary disease: the typhoid pattern', J. Hist. Med., 1982, 37: 168.
56 Lancet, 1878, i: 323; ii: 414.
57 In general, thepattern oftyphusepidemics closely follows thatofeconomic depression. Thus, in the last
decade of the eighteenth century, the depressions of 1794-5 and 1797-1800 were accompanied by typhus:
Creighton, op. cit., note 31 above, pp. 156-7, 159-62; Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, pp. 38-9.
Exceptionally, the severe depression of 1840-2 did not produce a typhus epidemic in England, only one of
relapsing fever. This was perhaps because the great epidemic of 1836-8 had eliminated adult susceptibles.
Not all deaths from typhus were erroneously registered in the later period. In 1890, for example, there
was an outbreak in St Olave, Southwark, and there were outbreaks in Cardiff (1892-3), Edinburgh (1898),
Dundee (1900), and elsewhere.
59 This phenomenon is impossible to substantiate closely. By the time accurate statistical series for streets
and houses become available, the disease was so far in retreat that the location ofcases is almostmeaningless.
The spot maps published by the Metropolitan Asylums' Board from 1892 onwards thus show an annual
scattering ofgenerally isolated cases across London, from which no pattern of infection can be deduced. In
St George, Southwark, small groups of cases suggest a possible lingering of some local source ofinfection,
but in St Giles only one case oftyphus was notified between 1892and 1900. Total annual typhus notifications
for the city were by this time in single figures. It should be noted that the published figures are not corrected
for the misdiagnoses which certainly occurred. For the earlier part of the century, however, Dickens's
observation (in Bleak House, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1971, p. 364) of "fever houses" where "for
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authorities as the particular haunts oftyphus.60 In the parish ofSt Giles, forexample,
the courts and alleys around Great Wild Street and Drury Lane were notorious.61 In
East London, Whitechapel was the "nucleus of the metropolitan fever field", while
among the southern districts, St Olave and St George Southwark were prominent.62
In these districts and others like them, it was apparently true that particular houses
constituted the foci ofinfection. William Rendle, for twenty-four years the Poor Law
medical officer in St George Southwark, and subsequently, if briefly, its Medical
Officer ofHealth, declared that there were comparatively few centres ofinfection for
typhus, and that most typhus cases came from certain houses.63
One such house, 131 Drury Lane in St Giles, was described in detail in a Lancet
report of 1865 as "a capital illustration ofthe method ofpreserving typhus". A large,
three-storey building with a dirty plaster front, it housed a second-hand clothes shop
in the basement. A notice advertised rooms to let, notwithstanding that the whole
house was full oftyphus. Every room contained two or three people. The disease had
begun with a second-floor family whose daughter, living in nearby Drury Court, had
caught the infection from a fellow lodger there. For two months the disease spread
from family to family at 131 Drury Lane, but did not interrupt the various
occupations pursued underthat roof, including themanufacture oftrinkets forladies'
heads and dresses.64
If such houses were not cleansed and disinfected once typhus cases had occurred,
infected louse faeces shaken out of clothing and bedding might lie undisturbed for
years, awaiting the arrival of further non-immune occupants, or the disturbance
caused by increased crowding, to generate fresh cases. As late as 1879, Dr Lovett of
St Giles could declare that every outbreak oftyphus in the district had been traced to
Lincoln Court and Orange Court, Drury Lane.65 More than forty years earlier,
Gerhard observed a similar phenomenon in Philadelphia.66 Charles Murchison's
belief in the spontaneous generation of typhus, based on particular instances, also
suggests that the houses themselves were implicated.67 The role of housing in
sustaining the disease was probably assisted by the rapid turnover of inhabitants in
quarters suchas StGiles. In 1861, forexample, the London City Mission found thatin
one month half the families in Monmouth Court, St Giles, had been replaced.68
Unrecognized cases, particularly among children, who are not seriously affected by
the disease, undoubtedly also sustained typhus in particular districts and among a
particular class.69
months and months" the inhabitants were carried out dead and dying by the dozens, should not be
forgotten.
60 MOAR St George-the-Martyr, 1866-7, p. 6.
61 Lancet, 1865, H: 522.
62 Ibid., pp. 267, 602, 657.
63 W. Rendle, London vestries andtheirsanitary work, London, John Churchill, 1865, pp. 11-12; Lancet,
1869, i: 737.
64 Lancet, 1865, ii: 522.
65 Ibid., 1879, ii: 793.
66 L. G. Wilson, 'Fevers and science in early nineteenth-century medicine', J. Hist. Med., 1978, 33: 401.
67 Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, pp. 99-104.
68 Lynn H. Lees, Exiles ofErin, Manchester University Press, 1979, p. 58.
69 Collie, op. cit., note 43 above, p. 107.
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Thepersistenceoftyphusinparticularlocalities, anditsspreadintonewones,70were
determined by specific factors: the character ofthe population living there, their dirt
and the filthy conditions of the houses in which they lived, and particularly
overcrowding. Medical Officers repeatedly pointed out that overcrowding, lack of
ventilation and want ofcleanliness were the chiefcauses ofthe disease, and that these
characterized the dwellings ofthe poorer classes.7' The Medical Officer for Liverpool
went further. In a survey of the disease in Liverpool over the years 1862-6, he
discoveredthat93percentofthecity'styphusdeathsoccurredamongtheweekly-wage
earning class, who inhabited courts and alleys "where sanitary provisions are
conspicuously absent". Oftheremainingtyphusdeaths, 5.4percenttook place among
the small shopkeeping class, and 1.3 per cent (some 100 individuals) among scripture
readers, medical men, relieving officers, pawnbrokers and undertakers, who all risked
contact with typhus patients in one way or another.72
In London,weekly-wageearnersconstitutedalargeproportionoftheworkingclass,
and most were in occupations that experienced seasonal slackness, with under- or
unemployment. Among this class, it was a common emergency economy for families
and friends to double up in accommodation.73 When a seasonal depression coincided
with severeweather, the livingconditions ofthisclass deteriorated, leaving them more
vulnerable tocontagious disease. In theearly 1860s, increased crowdingin habitations
infested with typhus exposed more people to infection.
To this background of overcrowding and dirt should be added a third factor.
Charles Murchison thought that overcrowding, lack of ventilation, and destitution
with starvation were the most important causes oftyphus.74 All writers on the subject
agreed with him, including the eminent German epidemiologist, Rudolph Virchow.75
Creighton, asmentionedabove, thought thatsuppliesofcheapfood,fuel, andclothing
were chiefly responsible for the virtual disappearance of the disease. Modern
epidemiologists are less certain as to the relationship between nutritional standards
and typhus susceptibility.76 Again, the link between typhus and nutrition is only
indirect. Hungry people-who need not be starving, or even malnourished-feel the
cold more. Personal hygiene is affected: cold people do not like undressing. In such
conditions, lice find congenial hosts.
The spread of typhus was determined more by these factors than by actual
nutritional levels. Although the disease did not spread among the middle- and upper-
classes, it had no trouble in developing in well-nourished hosts when offered the
70 This was the case in Poplar. See below notes 80, 81.
71 MOAR Mile End Old Town, 1859, p. 6; MOAR Westminster, 1864-5, p. 14; MOAR Camberwell,
1864-5, p. 25. For the mechanics oftyphus transmission in overcrowded conditions, see W. P. MacArthur,
'The medical history of the famine' in R. D. Edwards and T. D. Williams (editors), The Great Famine,
Dublin, Browne and Nolan, 1956, pp. 271-2.
72 Lancet, 1867, ii: 608.
73 Jones, op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 117-18.
74 Murchison, op.cit., note41 above, p. 52. In thefinal analysis, Murchison regarded overcrowding as the
single most important element: ibid., pp. 340-1.
5 Lancet, 1867, ii: 701; 1868, i: 561, 572. This reference was to the second edition ofVirchow's work. For
the development ofVirchow's ideas, see Paul Weindling, 'Was social medicine revolutionary?', Bull. Soc.
soc. Hist. Med., June 1984, 34: 13-18.
76 Post, Food shortage, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 272-3; Luckin, op. cit., note 34 above, p. 113.
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opportunity. This was made abundantly clear during the Irish epidemic of 1848-9,77
and the 1860s epidemic also offers ample evidence. In April 1862, two Poor Law
medical officers in St George-in-the-East died oftyphus; in 1866, London society was
shocked by the death ofthe distinguished Dr Henry Jeaffreson, ofSt Bartholomew's
Hospital, from typhus; in 1868, the Reverend Henry Lance, who had served notably
during thecholeraepidemic, died oftyphus caughtwhilevisiting the poor. In 1869 the
Lancet observed, on the occasion of the deaths of two Rotherhithe doctors from
typhus, that the disease was "relentlessly" claiming many members ofthe profession.
By 1872, typhus was "that scourge of our profession".78 Middle-class victims were
almost certainly infected by inhaling contaminated dust; they never contracted
relapsing fever, for which contact with the body fluid of the louse is required.79
Poor nutrition was therefore not a primary determinant oftyphus outbreaks, and
typhus cannot be accepted as an unqualified indicator ofurban famine. The disease
continued to exist in household dust and among children in pockets where squalor
maintained, and an adult population which was generally immune limited, its
activities. Unusual local population movements could activate the epidemic
propensity of this residual infection. Thus social distress could start the typhus
sequence where indigenous disease existed, or where it was imported. But hunger or
distress were not the sole causes of social dislocation in Victorian cities.
The appearance of typhus in places experiencing good times confirms the
importance ofdislocation, as opposed todistress. The marked revival ofthedisease in
the East London district ofPoplar in the 1860s,80 for example, was probably due to
sudden, "stress" overcrowding. Poplarenjoyedasurgeofprosperity intheearly 1860s,
during which the numbers employed in the ship-building yards there increased from
13,000 in 1861, to 27,000 in 1865.81 Greenock similarlyexperienced atyphusepidemic
when overcrowding accompanied prosperity.82 The typhus outbreaks in Whitechapel
and St Olave in 1873 occurred during a "period ofunprecedented prosperity" and in
midsummer.83 It seems likely that the dislocation caused by the Shoreditch
improvement schemes in the East End, from 1872,84 and by demolitions for Peabody
Trust developments in Southwark in the early 1870s,85 was responsible for these
outbreaks which were, according to the Lancet, by no means on an epidemic scale.86
III
Typhus admissions to the London Fever Hospital increased considerably in the
spring after the severe winter of 1860-1, but it was not until mid-December that the
77 MacArthur, op. cit., note 71 above, p. 278-9.
78 Lancet, 1862, i: 448; 1866, ii: 680; 1868, i: 102; 1869, i: 306; 1872, i: 276.
79 MacArthur, op. cit., note 71 above, p. 280.
80 Luckin, op. cit., note 34 above, p. 110.
81 Jones, op. cit., note 12 above, p. 102.
82 Collie, op. cit., note 43 above, p. 107.
83 Lancet, 1873, ii: 22.
84 SeePercyJ. Edwards,Historyofmetropolitanstreetimprovements 1855-1897, LondonCountyCouncil,
1898, pp. 45-51. It was admitted that 2,920 persons had been displaced by these operations.
85 J. N. Tarn, Five per cent philanthropy, Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 49-50.
86 Lancet, 1873, ii: 212.
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disease became epidemic. It then spread rapidly: in January 1862 the number of Fever
Hospital admissions for typhus was 140, among the highest monthly totals in its
history.87 From 1862 until 1870 the number oftyphus admissions to the Hospital, and
the number of'fever' deaths registered in London, remained at epidemic level (figure
1). Theepidemic of 1862-70 was almost certainly self-generated, not introduced to the
city from elsewhere. The disease had been introduced from Ireland in 1847-8, and it
was widely assumed by the 1860s that typhus was generally the result of Irish
importation.88 In 1856, however, therewas no typhus epidemic in Ireland; the London
outbreak was an isolated one.89 Similarly, in 1862 there was no evidence to support a
suggestionofIrishorigin. Thediseasedidnotbecomeepidemic in Ireland until 1863;90
of992 typhus cases admitted to the London Fever Hospital in the first six months of
1862, onlyforty-fourwere Irish, and ofthese, all but five had lived in London for more
than three months and none had recently arrived from Ireland.91 Almost all the first
cases admittedwere unemployed maletramps with no fixed address, who had suffered
fromwant formanyweeks. Manyofthem had been only a fewweeks in London,92 but
the ten-day incubation period of typhus indicates that they contracted it in London
itself. The Irishwere not responsible for introducingepidemic typhus in 1856 and 1861,
norcanthedeclinein typhus belinked to any reduction in Irish immigration. Although
the proportion of Irish-born persons living in London fell steadily after 1851, the
actual numbers arriving from Ireland increased in the 1870s and 1880s. The Irish
contributed 14,000 immigrants to London in the decade 1851-61; 7,000 in 1861-71;
19,000 in 1871-81; and 20,000 in 1881-91.93
Charles Murchison argued that, while the Irish did not import typhus to London in
all instances ofepidemics, they contributed substantially in another way. It was well
known, hewrote, thatby the "immigration ofthelowerclasses ofIrish, pauperism and
habitsofovercrowding and personal uncleanliness-the main causes ofthe prevalence
oftyphus-have been greatly augmented in the large towns ofBritain".94 In the twelve
years 1855-1867, 4.9 per cent ofLondon Fever Hospital admissions were Irish-born,
against the 75 per cent who were natives of London. A high proportion of the latter
were, however, children of Irish parents or of Irish extraction.95 Murchison's views
werebasedonhisexperience at the Hospital. The second Medical Officer ofHealth for
StGiles, Dr Ross, shared Murchison's viewofIrishdomestic habits. The Irish were, he
wrote, "destitute ofany notion ofthe proper use ofthe domestic appliances instituted
for cleanliness and decency in towns". Ross's experience was firsthand: in the Great
Wild Street-Church Street area, within the St Giles fevernest, was an Irish colonywith
87 Ibid., 1862, i: 207-8.
88 Luckin, op. cit., note 34 above, pp. 106-7.
89 Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 57; Hirsch, op. cit., note 28 above, p. 556; Lancet, 1863, i: 422.
Although typhus was certainly introduced by the Irish in 1846, the situation in English cities was such that
thedisease wouldprobably haveappearedwithin a relatively short time in anycase: Creighton, op. cit., note
31 above, p. 205.
90 Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 52.
91 Ibid., p. 55.
92 Ibid., pp. 58, 54.
93 Lees, op. cit., note 68 above, p. 58; Shannon, op. cit., note 25 above, p. 84.
94 Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, pp. 58-9.
95 Ibid., p. 57.
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a fairly constant number of changing individuals.96 Modern historians confirm the
squalor anddestitution ofthe Irish slums: there can be little doubt that they were ideal
habitats for typhus.97
Fromthespringof1862toNovember 1863, thetyphusepidemicwasconfined to the
poorestandmostdenselypopulatedpartsofthecity.98 In 1862, 53 percentofthecases
admitted to the London Fever Hospital came from eight districts, with St George-in-
the-East contributing 179 cases, St Pancras (where the Agar Town slum hadjust been
razed) 162, and the City 157.99 In 1863, nearly all the cases received by the Hospital
were reported as having come, to date, from the most crowded areas, from
Bermondsey, Lambeth, StGeorge-in-the-East, RotherhitheandtheCity.100Attheend
of October 1863 it was observed that several parishes had experienced marked
fluctuations in the incidence ofthe disease, but St George-in-the-East and St Pancras
furnished the "most constant and equable supply" ofpatients. A month laterpatients
were still being received mainly from the south and east (from Rotherhithe,
Bermondsey, Lambeth, St Saviour, and St George-in-the-East), but there were
indications that the disease was spreading. More cases were arriving from Shoreditch
and the City, and others were being brought in from Hackney and Kensington, which
had not furnished cases for months previously.'0' By 1864, the epidemic was more
generallydiffusedthroughthecity,althoughitsfocusremainedthepoorestareas.102In
1865, itwasprevalentinthesouthern andcentraldistricts, but from 1866 on, the focus
shifted to the east, where it remained until the epidemic began to wane. In 1868, for
example, typhus cases were coming to the Hospital principally from Stepney,
Whitechapel, Shoreditch and other East End districts.'03
The London Fever Hospital's records do not provide a straightforward picture of
the epidemic's distribution. Not only were milder cases generally treated at home, but
although the Hospital was the only metropolitan institution for typhus victims before
October 1871, caseswerenotautomatically sent tothe Hospital fromallthedistricts in
themetropolis. Someparishespreferred to save theexpense oftreatmentanddealwith
casesintheirownworkhouseinfirmaries. Significantly, Whitechapel and St Gileswere
bothin thisclass.'04Whitechapelprovidedperhaps themost notorious example ofthe
practice. As its Medical Officer ofHealth observed in 1868, it was probably inhabited
bythepoorerclassestoagreaterextentthananyotherdistrictin London;'05itwassaid
96 MOAR ST Giles, 1870, p. 13. See also Lees, op. cit., note 68 above, p. 66-7.
97 Lees, op. cit., note 68 above, pp. 71-87; M. 0. Tuathaigh, 'The Irish in nineteenth-century Britain',
Trans. R. Hist Soc., 5th series, 1981, 31: 154.
98 Lancet, 1863, ii: 422.
99 LFHAR, 1862, p. 6.
°° Ibid., 1863, p. 7.
101 Lancet, 1863, ii: 603.
102LFHAR, 1864, pp. 6-7.
103 Ibid., 1868, p. 189; Luckin, op. cit., note 34 above, Table 5.1, pp. 108-9.
104 LFHAR, 1866, p. 13. Three other districts also avoided the LFH charges: Mile End, Lewisham and
Poplar. St Giles began sending cases to the LFH on 1 April 1865; Whitechapel on 1 December 1865. Poor
Law cases were charged by the LFH at the rate of Is. a day until 1868. Thus the cost to, for example,
St George-in-the-East and St Pancras oftyphus cases in 1862 came to approximately £161 and £145.8s.0d.
respectively.
10s MOAR Whitechapel, vol. 2, 1868, p. 12.
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to be the centre ofthe metropolitan fever field.106 In the decade 1851-60, the district
contributed thelargest number ofmetropolitan feverdeaths, and the Lancetsuspected
it ofplaying a "too prominent" part in fostering the great 1861-70 epidemic.'07
In 1865, it was estimated that ofWhitechapel's 9,000 houses, 5,000 were let out as
lodging-houses, each containing an average ofthree families. The parish's population
in 1861 was 79,000; adensity of195persons peracre. In thePoor Lawyear(Lady Day,
i.e. 25 March, to Lady Day) 1864-65, 37 percent ofthis population received indoor or
outdoor relief.108 Until 1866, theWhitechapel authorities made no use ofthe London
FeverHospital,andtyphusvictimsweretreatedeitherintheworkhouse orathome.109
Both practices contributed to the spread ofinfection. The Lancet's own investigations
had clearly shown that the treatment of typhus victims in workhouse infirmaries
resultedonlytoofrequentlyinextensive "in-house" epidemics;"10hometreatmentwas
equally recognized as only multiplying the foci of infection. Vestry policy on the
treatment oftyphus cases was only one element in the epidemic spread ofthe disease,
and it was clearly not the mostimportant." 1 ' Nevertheless, in the context ofthe social
dislocation occurring among London's working class during the 1860s, the failure of
vestries to ensure the effective isolation of cases at the London Fever Hospital
contributed to the epidemic impetus.112
The waning of the epidemic in the later 1860s was not due to any change in the
virulence ofthe disease. In a recent essay analysing the decline oftyphus, Bill Luckin
examined and convincingly dismissed the possibility of autonomous change in the
nature of the disease."13 Explanation lies elsewhere, and in this respect the current
analysis differs from the Luckin interpretation. The ending of the London typhus
epidemic in 1870-1 was sudden, but no more so than in 1848 or in 1857. In both those
years, contemporary observers attributed the disappearance of the epidemic to the
restoration ofnormal marketconditions.114 In 1870-1, the situation was not so simple
andMurchison, forexample,hadnoretrospectiveexplanation tooffer.115 Breadprices
stabilized in the early 1870s, but they did not fall dramatically."16 It is possible that,
havingaffected some 190,000personsintheinnercity intheyears 1862-69,typhushad
106 Lancet, 1865, ii: 656.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
09 MOAR Whitechapel, 1865, p. 5
110 Lancet, 1865, ii: 656.
1 1 Neverless, vestry policy was probably important in sustaining the endemic level of the disease. The
London Fever Hospital's inability to eliminate typhus from certain courts may have been due to repeated
importation fromuncontrolled areasofthecity, or toinefficiencies ofdisinfection. See Bynum, op.cit., note
46 above, p. 106.
112 This element should not be exaggerated. Many typhus cases undoubtedly remained unknown to the
authorities. In 1869, the first year for which such a calculation is possible, admissions to the London Fever
Hospitalconstituted 17percentofestimated London cases; in 1870, 13 per cent. Thiscalculation is based on
the contemporary assumption of a case-fatality rate of 1 in 10. The London form of the disease was less
virulent than that in Lancashire, where mortality was circa 23 per cent: Fifth AnnualReport ofthe Medical
Officer to the Privy Council, [PP, 1863, XV, Appendix 2, pp. 229, 304].
113 Luckin, op. cit., note 34 above, pp. 113-14.
114 Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, pp. 51-3; Creighton, op. cit., note 31 above, p. 205.
115 Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 54.
116 Mitchell and Deane, op. cit., note 13 above, p. 498.
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diminished thepoolofaccessible, non-immunepotentialvictims;1 17 buttheconclusion
ofthemajorrailwayworkswasprobablycritical. Whilegeneral levels ofovercrowding
did not diminish, during the 1870s London experienced a period ofcomparative quiet
and prosperity,118 which probably reduced the incidence of short-term, expediency
overcrowding.
Urban crises did not disappear after 1870. Cyclical depression, unemployment and
distress, aggravated by the exceptionally severe winter, returned in 1878-9.119 During
the 1880s the city experienced a particularly prolonged period of social crisis, at its
worstbetween 1884and 1887.120Throughoutthisperiod,overcrowdingintheworking
class areas of the city scarcely abated. Average real wages, however, began to rise
steadily,'21 and the post 1870 London crises differed from those earlier: there were no
bread riots or semi-violent distress, and there were no typhus epidemics. The disease
continued to decline steadily (figure 1).
Yet typhus had declined substantially before. In the years 1803-15 it was markedly
absent inEngland.'22 Between 1858 and 1860, itwas so rare in London that therewere
serious plans to convert the London Fever Hospital into a general hospital.'23 The
decline oftyphus in the 1870s was not so sudden or dramatic that it was regarded by
contemporaries as anything more than a temporary respite. After all, even the 70 odd
deaths registered in London in 1879 and 1880 represented, in terms ofcontemporary
calculation, some 700cases.124 Indeed the distress in London in these years caused the
Lancet to warn against the outbreak ofepidemics.'25 The final decline of typhus in
London dates not from the early 1870s, but from the late 1870s and early 1880s. The
role ofthe nutritional factor is indirect; but important developments in the sanitation
of housing, water supplies, and hospital treatment,126 and changes in the nature of
urban social dislocation, both occurring in the years around 1870, were probably
critical to the subsequent history of typhus.
117 Thefigureof190,000 hasbeen arrived at bytakingthetotal typhus admissions to the LFH in the years
1862-9 andassuming, on the basis ofnote 112 above, that these represented 15 percent ofthe total number
of cases. The importance of provincial immigration in replenishing the non-immune pool was perhaps
limited: suchimmigrantstended tosettleintheoutersuburbsofthecity. Jones, op.cit., note 12above, p. 130.
In 1870, Murchison observed thatthemarkeddeclineintyphuswas "to someextent" due to theelimination
ofsusceptibles (LFHAR 1870, p. 8), buthe did not offer any retrospective confirmation ofthis observation.
118 Jones, op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 276-7.
119 Ibid., pp. 46, 277.
120 Ibid., pp. 281-2.
121 Mitchelland Deane, op.cit., note 13above, pp. 345-6. Seealsotherecent assessmentsbyHunt,op.cit.,
note 9 above, and Teitelbaum, op. cit., note 9 above.
122 Creighton, op. cit., note 31 above, pp. 162-7.
123 LFHAR, 1861, p. 6; Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 53.
124 In 1878, the Lancetcalculated on the basis of25 per cent mortality, among 179 completed cases at the
MetropolitanAsylumsBoardhospitals, thattherewere636casesoftyphusin Londonin 1877. Lancet, 1878,
i: 324. There were 151 registered typhus deaths in London in 1877, giving, on this basis, 604 cases.
125 Lancet, 1879, i: 63, 385-6.
126 Givenmodem assessment oftheaetiology ofthedisease, I cannot agree with Luckin (op. cit., note 34
above, p. 113) thatsewerage wasanecessary condition fortheeradication ofepidemictyphus. Human urine
and faeces can only transmit typhus ifthey contain blood: this method of transmission is not considered
important by any of the authorities cited in note 36 above.
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Very little improvement occurred in the housing conditions of the poorest of the
Londonworkingclasses inthelaternineteenthcentury,127 butdevelopments in thelater
1860s and 1870s may have been significant to typhus. In the first place, there were the
demolitions for railways and street improvement, and after the passing ofthe Artisan
Dwellings Act of 1875 these were supplemented by vestry- or Medical Officer of
Health-sponsored clearance schemes specifically aimed at fever nests. In St Giles, for
instance, the old fever dens of Great Wild Street and Little Coram Street were swept
away by 1883, and the clearance of two more (Shelton Street, Drury Lane, and the
Colonnade) wascontemplated.128 In 1887, the Lancet went so far as to remark that the
St Giles clearances had cleared typhus from London.'29
Meanwhile, although the provisions for the regulation ofcommon lodging houses in
the Sanitary Act of 1866 had proved almost unworkable, sanitary departments were
taking steps under existing legislation to remedy the worst ofthe superficial conditions
as far as possible. Specific sanitary defects were rectified under the Nuisance Removal
Acts; more generally, houses were cleaned and lime-washed. In St Martin-in-the-
Fields, Dr Beale "nearly succeeded" in having every tenement house cleansed and
whitewashed at least once a year during the late 1860s. Conditions in some courts, he
admitted, continued to be "disgraceful", but he stated that he found the cleaning and
repairing of tenement houses less difficult every year. In 1867, notices to cleanse had
been attended to with "tolerable exactness", and in no instance had it been necessary to
call on the magistrates for aid.130 In St Giles, 12,573 improvement orders were issued
between 1875 and 1883, and 7,770 houses cleansed-an average of971 per annum.131
Since this district had only 3,968 inhabited houses in 1881, apparently some 24.5 per
cent of its housing stock was cleansed every year.
The combination offever-nest demolition and regular cleaning may have gone some
way to removing the old typhus habitats. If low-level non-epidemic typhus was
sustained between epidemics by the survival of Rickettsia prowazeki in dried louse
faeces, and by the continuous flow ofnewcomers into (and out of) poor lodgings, the
regular cleaning of this type of housing would break the cycle of transmission. In
Liverpool, forexample, itwassaid thatregularcleaning and supervision hadeliminated
typhus from the city's common lodging houses between 1848 and 1863.132It may also
be relevant that in the years 1868-79, the London Medical Officers of Health had to
contend with three successive major outbreaks of contagious diseases recognized as
epidemic: scarlet fever, in 1868-70; and smallpox, in 1870-3 and 1876-8. Direct results
oftheseepidemicswerewidespreadhouse-to-housevisitations insearch ofcontacts and
unvaccinated children; and equally widespread disinfection ofthe homes, bedding and
clothing ofvictims throughout London, both on a scale never experienced before. The
127 Jones, op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 174-8; A. S. Wohl, Theeternalslum, London, Edward Arnold, 1977,
chapter 2.
8MOAR St Giles, 1883, p. 73. Shelton Street went in 1889: ibid., 1889, p. 21.
129 Lancet, 1887, i: 632.
130 MOAR St Martin, 1867, p. 19. Beale found that these houses rapidly became dirty again: ibid., 1868,
p. 18.
131 MOAR St Giles, 1883, p. 73.
132 Seventh Annual Report of the Medical Officer to the Privy Council, [PP, 1865, XXVI,
appendix 8, p. 4781.
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implementation ofthese preventive measures was undoubtedly particularly thorough
in the poorest areas which were the most vulnerable to sanitary supervision.
In these years, increased provision was also made to enable the poortocleanse their
bodies, clothes andhomesthemselves. Bill Luckinhasargued that, althoughpercapita
water consumption in the eastern and northern districts rose from twenty to
twenty-four gallons a day by the mid-1870s, it was not until the 1890s that more than
50 per cent ofthis population had access to company water, or were provided with a
more than intermittent supply.'33 In fact, company-supplied constant service was
widely provided in the east, although less so in the northern districts, by 1880.'34 The
East LondonWaterCompanywasapioneerinthisrespect. Asearlyas 1868, DrLiddle
recorded that the poorest parts ofVAitechapel were probably better provided with
water than "any other district in London'35 In 1869, the East London Compnay
resolved toextendconstantsupplythroughoutitsdistrict, andhad achieved this object
within its metropolitan area by 1883.
Although in the poorest courts water was often supplied by standpipes, not laid on
to houses, theconvenience ofaconstant supply and the alteration in patterns ofwater
usagewhichthisentailed becamewidespread in East London inthe 1870s. Itisdifficult
toassesshowfartheavailabilityofaconstantsupplyimprovedpersonalcleanliness.136
While it is clear from evidence presented before the 1884 Royal Commission on
Housing, forexample,'37 that an inadequate water supply continued to be a difficulty
in some ofthepoorerdistricts ofthecity, theextension ofconstant watersupplies may
have contributed to household cleanliness, and thus to the typhus ecology.
Hospital provision was the third area in which significant developments occurred.
Although the pressure which the 1860s epidemic brought to bear on workhouse
services caused many districts to resort early to London Fever Hospital treatment for
their typhus cases, this was an expensive proceeding for economy-minded Guardians
to sanction. The situation altered with the passing of the Metropolitan Poor Act of
1867, which introduced rateequalization as a means ofspreading the financial burden
of London's poor more evenly. Money spent on the hospitalization of infectious-
disease victims could be reclaimed from the Common Poor Fund, thus removing
133 Luckin, op. cit., note34above, p. 112. Itispossible todisagreewiththelastpartofthisstatement, since
thesources onwhichitisbased stem from the London CountyCouncil [LCC]-abody notoriouslyinvolved
in the politics of the water question. Aggregate water supply figures given in the 1890s generally refer to
'Water London', an area considerably larger than Registration London: Nineteenth Annual Report ofthe
LocalGovernment Board, [PP, 1890, XXXIII, Appendix B no. 2, p. 237]. The LCCcommonly seems to have
usedthestatisticsofWater London asiftheyreferred tothesmallerareaofMetropolitan London. Thewider
issues of the politics of London water in the 1890s have not as yet been satisfactorily analysed. But see
A. Shadwell, The London watersupply, London, Longmans Green and Co., 1899, especially chapter 1; and
A. K. Mukhopadhyay, 'The politics of London water', London J., 1975, 2: 207-12; idem., The politics of
London water supply 1871-1971, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London University, 1972.
134 Anne Hardy, 'Parish pump to private pipes: London's water supply in the nineteenth century', in
W. F. Bynum (editor), Living and dying in London 1700-1900, London, Routledge, [in press].
135 Lancet, 1868, i: 273.
136 Martin Daunton, Houseandhomeinthe Victoriancity,London, EdwardArnold, 1983, p.42, notesthat
one bath and one clothes' wash a week were still customary in working-class households well into the
twentieth century.
137 Report ofthe Royal Commission on the Housing oftheWorkingClasses, [PP, 1884-5, XXX, p. 13]. It
should be noted that local authorities had no power to compel the supply ofwater for domestic purposes,
only for sanitation. Domestic water provision thus remained a frequent difficulty in small houses whose
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inhibitions about excess spending.138 The number ofadmissions to the London Fever
Hospital certainly rose sharply in 1868 (typhus admissions increased to 449, from 254
in theprevious year, in the threemonths June-August), but as the numbers oftyphoid
admissions and ofregistered feverdeathsalso rose, theimpact ofthenewlegislation in
this area cannot be quantitatively assessed. Given the aetiology of the disease,
however, increased hospitalization was likely a more effective preventive measure for
typhus than for such genuinely infectious diseases as scarlet fever and smallpox.
During the 1870s, moreover, hospital provision for fever patients was extended with
the opening of the Metropolitan Asylums Board hospitals.'39
Finally, during the 1870s, the rate ofrailwa demolitions eased. Although railway
displacementscontinued to bemade in the 18 esewere not on as large a scale, or
quickly effected, as those which took place int'he central and eastern districts in the
early to mid-1860s. Between 1867 and 1885, some 19,000 persons were displaced by
railway schemes, compared with 37,000 between 1859 and 1867.140 Pressure on
housing in the centre did not ease, because railways, street improvements, slum
demolition and warehouse construction continued relentlessly,'4' but the impact of
these operations was morediffused and thedegree ofsocial dislocation less acute than
in the previous decade.
Inthissense, andwiththetemporarystabilization ofthemetropolitan workingclass
economy, London's crisis of the 1860s, and with it the essential conditions for the
continuance of epidemic typhus, passed in the 1870s. During that decade crucial
environmental improvements eventually, although perhaps not finally until the 1880s,
dislodged the disease from its seats ofresidual survival. Rising real wages meanwhile
took the edge off urban distress in the later years of the century, and prevented
large-scale'stress' overcrowding. PovertyandmiserydidnotdisappearinLondon, but
bread riots and semi-violent distress did.142
IV
The importance of local conditions, and of social dislocation in particular, in
creating an environment favourable to epidemic typhus is confirmed by what can be
ascertained of the behaviour of the disease in towns and cities other than London.
Edinburgh's non-manufacturing population was vulnerable to typhus in seasons of
general distress, but social dislocation generated by specific factors was rare.
Nevertheless, whenin 1826thecityexperienced failures inbuildingspeculations which
disturbed its internal economy, typhus became seriously epidemic.'43 In the early
1850s, Dr James Brown, practising his newly-acquired skills in the diagnostic
owners were reluctant to pay 3d. a week for it: ibid., q. 9632; in any case the supply was generally ofcold
water only.
138 Metropolitan Poor Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 60, ss. 61-69.
l39 G. M. Ayers, England'sfirst state hospitals and the Metropolitan Asylums Board, London, Wellcome
Institute of the History of Medicine, 1971, part I.
140 Dyos, 'Railways', op. cit., note 19 above, p. 14.
141 Jones, op. cit., note 12 above, chapter 8; Wohl, op. cit., note 127 above, chapter 2.
142 Jones, op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 45, 54.
143 Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 45, 54.
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distinction offevers,searcheddiligentlyinRochester, ChathamandStroodforcasesof
typhus andrelapsingfever. Thetownswereinconstantcontactwith London, andwere
on the tramp routes. Typhoid was endemic, but neither of the "famine fevers"
occurred, because, Brown concluded, there was very little overcrowding or
destitution.144When typhus appeared atPreston inJuly 1862, it had been absent from
the town for fifteen years; contemporaries traced the origin of the first cases to
".overcrowding",145 which was probably caused by stress. The disappearance ofthe
disease, fromJanuary 1863, probably indicates theextent towhich thecharitablerelief
which poured into the area succeeded in ameliorating the textile operatives' distress:
this was also the opinion of contemporary experts.146
During the 1860s, typhus was seriously epidemic in Liverpool and Glasgow, as well
as in London. Unlike London, however, both cities had direct connections with
Ireland, and both suffered continuously from typhus. Once again, however, it is clear
that the initial epidemic impetus could not have come from Ireland, as the epidemic
only developed there subsequently. The circumstances of Glasgow are obscure,
although aslateas 1886thecity's MedicalOfficerofHealthwrotethatitwasneverfree
oftyphus.'47ContemporaryopiniondifferedastothecauseoftheLiverpoolepidemic:
the Medical Officer ofHealth thought it due to stress, following the Cotton Famine,
which went largely unrelieved because the city was outside the central Lancashire
textiledistrict.148George Buchanan, investigating forthePrivyCouncil, disagreed but
wasunable to reach any firmconclusion as to theepidemic's causes.149There seems to
have been no extraordinary distress in Liverpool in the later 1860s,150 but it may be
significantthatthisdecadesawrailwayoperationsadvanceintotheheartofthecity.151
TheparishofLiverpoollost2,717inhabitedhousesand 31,389inhabitants in theyears
1860-71, and its excess ofdeaths over births stood at2,660 perannum.152 Typhus was
alreadyendemicin thecity, and localcircumstances arelikely to havebeenresponsible
for its epidemic escalation in these years.
Typhus continued to exist in the centres ofmost large towns until the 1880s,153 but
showed little inclination to escalate in these years ofgeneral prosperity, except briefly
in 1874. The return of less settled conditions in the early 1880s brought some
indications of a resurgence. Various small outbreaks of the disease in the northern
towns came incidentally to the Local Government Board's notice in these years,
causing anxiety in the Medical Department. Finally, George Buchanan, then Medical
144 Lancet, 1855, i: 436.
145 Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 54; Fifth Report ofthe Medical Oficer to the Privy Council,
[PP, 1863, XXV, p. 18].
146George Buchanan, 'Recent typhus in Lancashire', Trans. epidem. Soc., 1862, 2: 23.
147 Lancet, 1886, ii: 620. The current argument's relevance to conditions in Glasgow is not illuminated by
Olive Checkland and Margaret Lamb (editors), Health care as social history: the Glasgow case, Aberdeen
University Press, 1982.
48 Lancet, 1867, ii: 608.
149Seventh Annual Report of the Medical Officer to the Privy Council, [PP, 1865, XXVI, appendix 8,
pp. 481-5].
50 Ibid., p. 481.
151 J. R. Kellett, The impact ofrailways on Victorian cities, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969,
p. 201.
152 Lancet, 1875, i: 96-7.
153 Ibid., 1878, i: 323.
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Officer to the Local Government Board, mindful of "the conditions of so many
industrial communities", arranged for these outbreaks to be studied more closely in
1885-6. Theinvestigationproved revealing. Infiveoftheseventeentownsinvestigated,
thediseasewasshown"withstrongprobability" tohavebeenimported.154Noneofthe
importations werefrom Ireland, although in fivecasesoutbreakswereinnorth-eastern
seaports where Irish communication was a reality. At Carlisle, Gateshead and
Oldham, tramps were the vehicle ofinfection; at Quarry Bank, hop-pickers returning
from Herefordshire; at Middlesbrough, a discharged prisoner. Importation was also
suspected in Sunderland.'15 In Leeds, West Derby, and Hartlepool, it proved
impossible to trace the origins ofthe outbreaks. All three occurred in very poor areas
(in Leeds and Middlesbrough, the localities were Irish), and spread by recognized
channels, among relatives, friends and neighbours. At Hartlepool, it was noted that
poverty amounting to distress had been present in thewinterof 1885-6, because ofthe
depressed state of the shipping industry; at Quarry Bank, a town dependent on the
chain-making industry, trade had also been much depressed, and a strike had further
reduced wages, when typhus appeared in a particularly insanitary district.'56
In Maryport and Liverpool, eastern seaports with histories of typhus where free
communication with Ireland might have been found to have been a crucial factor, the
Board's Inspector Spear was not convinced ofits significance. In Maryport. most of
the frequent and "somewhat mysterious" reappearances of typhus could not be so
explained. TheMaryportoutbreaksrecurredin onepoorquarterofthetownwherethe
lodging houses, the resort ofsailors and dock labourers, were found. Nelson Street, in
particular, saw repeated cases. In Liverpool, the Medical Officer ofHealth's inquiries
only occasionally revealed importations from Ireland or elsewhere. Liverpool typhus,
whetherinitsendemicorepidemicform,appearedwithincertainwell-defined limits, in
theolderandgenerallylow-lyingdistrictstowardstheriver,inSouthToxtethwardand
neighbouring localities. Here were long narrow streets, confined courts and cellar
dwellings occupied by the poorest ofthe poor, mainly Irish unskilled labourers, who
found aprecarious livelihood in thedocks, and theirfamilies. In theselocalities, Spear
observed, typhus appeared to be indigenous, and most frequently an outbreak would
appear to be linked with an earlier one, "or antecedent cases before unrecognised are
found to have occurred amongst the children of the resident population (if the
constantlyshiftingseethingmassofsqualidhumanitymaybe sodesignated), and there
all further trace is lost".'57
Typhus thus continued endemic, ifgenerally submerged, in Liverpool until the later
1890s at least, with occasional epidemic outbreaks to testify to its survival. In London,
the chance discovery ofa typhus-nest in the district ofSt Olave, in 1890, suggests the
possibility of a similarly submerged existence.158 The experience of Nelson Street,
154 The seventeen were Accrington, Carlisle, Flint, Gateshead, Hartlepool, Jarrow, Leeds, Liverpool,
Maryport, Middlesbrough, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Oldham, Quarry Bank, Salford, Sunderland, West
Derby, and Warrington. See figure 2.
155 Spear, op. cit., note 43 above, p. 957. 15 Ibid., pp. 947, 950.
157 Ibid., p. 956.
158 This outbreak, of between thirty and fifty cases, occurred in Sard's Rents, a blind alley with a
population of211 and thirty houses which were mostly offensive from dirt and poor ventilation, old, and
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Maryport, is yet more instructive. Here Spear found reason to attribute the outbreak
to "the revivification of long dormant household contagion". He discovered that
Nelson Street contained a marine store dealer, whose proprietress admitted that she
had often taken rags from fever-stricken houses. Her business had probably been the
source ofthe many cases in the district over the years, and the culminating outbreak
occurred whenshemoved house, and hercontaminated rag-store was disturbed.'59 In
Carlisle and Salford, furthermore, difficulty had been experienced in avoiding
recurring outbreaks in rooms supposed to have been disinfected; Spear warned
particularly against the premature withdrawal of surveillance from infected
localities.160
The conclusions which Spear drew from his inquiries in 1886-7 illustrate the extent
to which different factors operated in different areas, even within a limited period. He
emphasized the difficulty ofidentifying the origin ofmost outbreaks, and noted that
early cases were frequently so mild as to pass unrecognized, and that the habit ofthe
disease was to "creep steadily on" for some time until multiple cases in different
households combined to exert an "explosive force". Cases appeared amid destitution
and squalor; he attributed the current relative inactivity oftyphus to the comparative
absence ofdistress. Spear himselfseems to have favoured migration as the trigger for
outbreaks,'61 but the evidence ofMaryport, Carlisle and Salford clearly suggests the
importance ofresidual ordormantinfection in someareas. Themildnessofearlycases
alsosuggestscontinuing, submergedinfection amongchildpopulationsinsometowns.
This may have activated outbreaks among adults when the "ecological" balance of
housing for the poor was disturbed in times of stress, as it was, for example, in
Hartlepool and Quarry Bank in 1885-6. By this date, the degree to which outbreaks
escalated often depended on the vigilance of the local health authorities: at Leeds,
Hartlepool, Carlisle, Middlesbrough, Oldham, Newcastle, Flint and repeatedly in
Liverpool, the disease became established through the neglect ofunrecognized cases;
but in Accrington, Warrington, Gateshead, Sheffield and Jarrow, and in Chelsea,
Southwark and Camberwell where there were also episodes at this time, initial cases
were promptly recognized and dealt with, so forestalling any considerable
outbreak.162
Spear's inquiry, while it provides no evidence of serious Irish links, suggests that
migration, household dust infection, and residual endemic typhus all contributed at
times to epidemic outbreaks, but that the critical factor in epidemic escalation was
often extraordinary distress caused by local economic factors and accompanied by
social dislocation.'63 In Liverpool, the disease was maintained among a poor
population which, withincertaingeographical limits, wasconstantlymobilein squalid
and overcrowded living conditions. In Maryport, similarly, the disease occurred
partlydilapidated. The first victims slept on bare floorboards which may have harboured infected dust. The
Lancet spoke of Sard's Rents explicitly as "one more of the spots in London where typhus can maintain
itself'. Lancet, 1890, ii: 406; see also MOAR St Olave, 1889-90, pp. 76-80.
159 Spear, op. cit., note 43 above, pp. 953, 960. 160 Ibid., p. 959.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid., p. 960.
163 Ibid., p. 961.
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principally in an area of the town with a poor and highly mobile population. The
predominance ofportsamongthetownsstudiedin 1887(seefigure2)maybeexplained
bytheirgreatervulnerabilitytoimports, butalsobytheirsocialstructure. Bytheirvery
nature, portscouldnotavoidthegrowth ofquarters ofcheap housingandatransitory
andoftendisreputable population. Sanitary supervision was difficultin such quarters,
and it was here that typhus stood its best chance of residual survival. Given its
endemic survival in places such as Maryport and Liverpool, coastal traffic
and ordinary population movements would ensure occasional outbreaks elsewhere,
especially in other seaboard towns attracting a similar traffic and population. The
originofthe 1887outbreak atCarlisle, forexample,wastracedto Maryport, viaaman
whohadtravelled throughCumberland insearchofwork,whileaprolonged outbreak
atWorkington in 1884 had spread by demonstrable links to Dearham, Maryport and
Whitehaven.l64
V
Thedisappearance ofepidemictyphusfromVictoriancitiesconstituted asignificant
improvement in the living conditions of adult urban populations, and marks
something ofawatershed inurbanhealth history. Rural immigrants tothesecitieshad
been especially vulnerable; now a major cause of their mortality was removed. In
epidemic terms, life became considerably more secure for the urban poor and for the
middle classes directly involved with them. For social and medical historians, the
survival ofepidemictyphusuntilthe 1870ssuggests thecontinuation ofurbancrisesof
the pre-industrial type, in which social dislocation was associated with epidemic
disease, long after the towns had been released from harvest-related supplyproblems;
as well as the significance of local economic conditions in determining disease
behaviour. The disappearance of typhus represents, on the one hand, the arrival of
structural, as well as economic and social, stability; on the other, the effectiveness of
local public health programmes after 1870.
Detailed analysis ofthe nineteenth-century typhus experiences ofindividual towns
canaloneconfirm thehypothesis that socialdislocation was theprincipaldeterminant
ofepidemic outbreaks. According to Murchison, the disease was not endemic on the
Continent between epidemics as it was in Britain and, to an even greater extent, in
Ireland.165 In England, industrial development and rapid urbanization from the
later eighteenth century undoubtedly resulted in widespread stress among increasing
urban populations, to an extent which may have paralleled the stress produced by
warfare on the Continent. The conditions which sustained epidemic and endemic
typhusinIrelandarestillnotelucidatedfully,buturbanstressandthelowexpectations
of Irish urban immigrants may have been critical. To Murchison, Ireland's whole
social and economic structure lay at the root of her typhus endemicity.166
Nevertheless, Irish importation of epidemic typhus into England was not crucial
in determining explosions of the disease there. It was rather the social condition
164 Ibid., pp. 943, 947.
165 Murchison, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 57.
166Ibid., pp. 137-8.
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of individual cities that allowed the epidemic escalation of imported or residual
endemic typhus; and the steady disappearance oftyphus after 1880 reflects both the
vigilance ofhealth authorities, and the degree to which serious social and economic
dislocation was modified in English cities in the closing decades of the nineteenth
century.
FIGURE 2
Map of Towns involved in Typhus Outbreaks 1885-1887
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